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Net Neutrality: A State[d] Approach 
 KATHERINE GRAINGER† 
 
In 2018, the Federal Communications Commission ended federal net neutrality protections in its 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order. In response, many states introduced legislation to create their 
own state-level protections. States believe these protections are necessary, given the anti-
competitive nature of broadband internet and the resulting lack of choice that consumers face 
today in the broadband internet market. However, state regulations are the wrong response to 
the issue, as these regulations are likely to be federally preempted. Additionally, state regulations 
are logistically difficult to enforce across different states, given the interstate character of modern 
broadband internet. Instead, this Note proposes several alternative actions on federal, state, and 
local levels, to ensure a more stable long-term net neutrality framework in the United States.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you log into your computer to check your email. As you open 
your internet browser, you are greeted with a short list of websites that you are 
allowed to visit. When you sign up for home internet access, you have the option 
of several different choices of subscription plans—a cinema plan (Netflix, Hulu, 
HBO, Amazon Video), a social plan (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr, 
Gmail), a news plan (CNN, Reddit, Fox News, New York Times, Bloomberg), 
or a plan, for a higher price, which offers a combination of different websites 
based on your interests.  
These practices, which allow internet providers to pick and choose what 
sites consumers can access and exempt some websites from data caps, is a 
combination of several practices, involve both blocking and zero rating.1 In this 
hypothetical internet landscape, plans are limited on the back end as well—
internet service providers charge websites for internet users to reach their 
website, or slow down website speeds if website owners do not pay a monthly 
fee to ensure faster network speeds. This is known as paid prioritization.  
 This was the scenario many feared when the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) indicated its plan to roll back Obama-era net neutrality 
regulations in 2016.2 An internet without net neutrality is similar in some 
respects to the cable television industry—limited access based on a set 
subscription plan, rather than payment for a connection to access the internet as 
a whole. Many internet activists proclaimed that the FCC’s decision to remove 
the 2015 Obama-era regulations was the end of “a free and open internet.”3 
While it is true that the picture painted above justifies alarm, it is an unlikely 
outcome. Since the 2017 repeal, it is likely that the average internet user has not 
noticed any significant difference in their internet speed or content.  
Part I of this Note will provide a brief background of net neutrality, 
including the history of the Telecommunications Act, the current classification 
of broadband internet as an information service versus telecommunications 
service, and an overview of the main arguments for and against net neutrality. 
Part II will discuss the preemption authority of the FCC, particularly in the 
context of the recent Restoring Internet Freedom Order and the lawfulness of 
recent state approaches to net neutrality. Part II will also generally discuss the 
role of markets in the telecommunications sector. Part III will offer several 
recommendations for state or local-focused alternatives for net neutrality in the 
absence of federal regulation mandating such requirements. This Note proposes 
that state net neutrality legislation is not the solution, as it is lawfully preempted 
 
 1. Nisha K. De Lany, From a Developing Country’s Perspective: Is Net Neutrality a Non-Issue for South 
Africa?, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 347, 348 (2016).  
 2. Erin Tiernan, Here’s What the Internet Could Look Like Without Net Neutrality, METRO (July 13, 
2017), https://www.metro.us/news/politics/internet-without-net-neutrality. 
 3. Bill Moyers & Michael Winship, Trump’s FCC Wants to Kill a Free and Open Internet, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 11, 2017, 2:36 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trumps-fcc-wants-to-kill-a-free-and-
open-internet_us_5a2ede17e4b0cf10effbaf6e. 
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and difficult to implement at the state level. Instead, Congress should enact 
regulations that can resist the changing tides of opposing partisan policy 
objectives, or, absent such regulation, communities should look to local-based 
solutions. This Note seeks to provide a neutral, comprehensive review of the 
FCC’s preemption authority, an analysis of recent state-level net neutrality 
regulations, and a consideration of how broadband providers fall within markets 
more generally.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. DEFINING NET NEUTRALITY  
The term net neutrality (originally referred to as “network neutrality”) was 
first introduced in common usage by Columbia Law School Professor Tim Wu 
in 2003.4 Wu defined net neutrality as an internet that does not favor any one 
application over another.5 Wu’s statement was significant because at the 
inception of the internet, net neutrality was the default framework—internet 
service providers were unable to distinguish between services and content being 
transmitted over their networks.6 As technologies advanced, however, providers 
have now developed programs that can slow, block, or distinguish content based 
on its source.7  
Although there is no one definition of net neutrality, is it generally 
understood to include three key components: (1) anti-zero rating, (2) anti-
prioritization, and (3) the inability to block and “throttle” internet content. Zero 
rating is the practice that exempts some websites or services from data caps.8 
Opponents of zero-rating argue that it allows for potential abuse by a broadband 
service provider. For example, if a provider decided to zero-rate its own video 
streaming platform but include its competitors’ platforms in a user’s data cap, it 
may give an internet service provider an unfair advantage to enter the video 
streaming market.9  
Paid prioritization is the ability for broadband service providers to charge 
website operators for users to access their websites at faster speeds than other 
websites.10 This could be described as an internet “fast lane.”11 Paid 
prioritization favors the status quo, as more established websites and service 
 
 4. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 
141 (2003).  
 5. Id. at 145. 
 6. Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination Rule 
Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).  
 7. Id. at 5.  
 8. Devin Coldewey, WTF Is Zero Rating?, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 16, 2017, 7:20 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/16/wtf-is-zero-rating/. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Katharine Trendacosta, Busting Two Myths About Paid Prioritization, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 
16, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/busting-two-myths-about-paid-prioritization. 
 11. See Klint Finley, FCC Plans to Gut Net Neutrality, Allow Internet “Fast Lanes,” WIRED (Nov. 21, 
2017, 3:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fcc-prepares-to-unveil-plan-to-gut-net-neutrality/. 
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providers can afford paying a monthly sum to broadband service providers, 
whereas newer startup services likely cannot afford these fees on top of other 
overhead costs.12 
Finally, a net neutrality framework typically requires that broadband 
service providers be prevented from throttling and blocking internet content. 
Anti-throttling rules would prevent internet service providers from slowing 
down access to certain websites.13 Throttling is related to paid-prioritization— 
throttling is experienced by an end user, whereas paid prioritization is a potential 
regime that would allow websites to pay broadband service providers a fee to 
prevent throttling on their sites. Blocking involves completely cutting off 
customer access to certain websites.  
B. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
The FCC was first established under the Communications Act of 1934 (the 
“1934 Act”).14 Under the 1934 Act, Congress originally delegated authority to 
the FCC to “regulat[e] interstate and foreign commerce in communication by 
wire and radio.”15 The creation of the FCC was a part of a larger effort of the 
federal government to incorporate additional consumer protections during the 
New Deal.16 During the 1930s, the Roosevelt Administration sought to increase 
regulations in response to the strong monopolies and consolidation of wealth 
that had occurred throughout late 1800s and early 1900s under a predominantly 
deregulatory regime.17 Against this backdrop, Congress created the FCC to 
regulate the infant telephone industry.  
Six decades later, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(the “1996 Act”)—the first major overhaul of communications legislation since 
the 1934 Act. The stated purpose of the 1996 Act is “to promote competition 
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services 
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid 
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”18 
Although at the time the internet was in its burgeoning stages, the 1996 Act 
did not specifically direct the FCC how to regulate it. However, Congress did 
tangentially address regulation of the internet in section 230(b) of the 
 
 12. Id.  
 13. Shawn Marcum, Throttle Me Not: 2015 Open Internet Order Protects Unlimited Data Plan Users, 5 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 231, 242 (2016).  
 14. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018). 
 15. Id.  
 16. Will Rinehart, The Early History of the FCC Doesn’t Provide a Basis for Regulating Facebook and 
Google Now, MEDIUM (Jan. 10, 2017), https://medium.com/@willrinehart/the-early-history-of-the-fcc-doesnt-
provide-a-basis-for-regulating-facebook-and-google-now-fe5fd2f07acf. 
 17. Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Network Neutrality: A History of Common Carrier Laws 1884–2018, MEDIUM 
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@TebbaVonMathenstien/network-neutrality-a-history-of-common-
carrier-laws-1884-2018-2b592f22ed2e.  
 18. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2018) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
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Communications Decency Act. This statute regulates pornographic material on 
the internet; it states that: 
“It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal 
or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services.”19 
Although the 1996 Act expressed the broader congressional goal of 
promoting competition in the telecommunications industry, the majority of the 
FCC’s legal authority derives from the 1934 Act. For example, the 1934 Act 
includes several “substantive provisions”—Titles II, III, and VI.20 Each section 
addresses the FCC’s rulemaking authority with respect to different forms of 
communications services. Title II of the 1934 Act covers telephone and 
telegraph companies, which are known as telecommunications services.21 Title 
III covers radio transmission services including broadcast television, radio, and 
cellular phones.22 Title VI covers cable television companies.23 Title I defines 
key terms that apply to the other substantive provisions.24 Title I also defines 
“information services” but does not subject information services to regulation 
under any of the substantive provisions.25 Instead, Title I grants the FCC 
ancillary jurisdiction, which empowers it to “perform any and all acts, make 
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this 
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”26  
Scholars have debated Congress’s intent regarding the power behind Title 
I’s general grant of authority, particularly in the context of regulating the 
internet. Some believe that Title I does not confer authority to enforce law, rather 
it only confers procedural rulemaking authority.27 The Supreme Court read this 
delegation of authority broadly in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 
There, the Court held that even though the 1934 Act did not explicitly delegate 
power to the FCC to deal with practices contrary to the public interest, Congress 
acted swiftly in response to fears of monopoly control of the telecommunications 
industry, and the Act intended to give the Commission “expansive powers.”28  
 
 19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(3) (2018). 
 20. James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 101, 106 (2010) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 521 (2018)). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2018). 
 25. Id.  
 26. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2018). 
 27. Speta, supra note 20, at 107.  
 28. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). 
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However, others point out that the grant of authority to regulate the internet 
has been narrowed in a modern context. After all, the 1996 Act did not address 
how the internet should be regulated when Congress had the opportunity to 
modify it. Further, the Communications Decency Act, though it mentions the 
internet, states that it is Congress’s policy to promote a vibrant open market 
“unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”29 The text does not read as a 
congressional delegation of power to implement an extensive internet regulatory 
scheme, but expresses a preference for the FCC to pursue a deregulatory agenda.  
C. EARLY REGULATION OF NET NEUTRALITY VIOLATIONS 
In the early days of internet regulation, the FCC did not promulgate any 
rules regarding its stance on net neutrality, but instead, it dealt with violations 
through adjudication.30 For example, in 2005, a small internet provider named 
Madison River Communications was accused of blocking ports used for Voice 
over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) services.31 Vonage, a competitor of Madison 
River, filed a complaint with the FCC.32 After an investigation, Madison River 
agreed to stop blocking VoIP ports, and paid a $15,000 fine to the government.33 
Another documented instance of the FCC regulating through adjudication 
occurred in 2005, when Comcast began blocking peer-to-peer networking 
technologies, most famously BitTorrent, that consumers were accessing through 
its network.34 When Comcast was first confronted about the issue, it denied 
responsibility.35 A Comcast spokesperson even stated, “[w]e’re not blocking any 
access to any application, and we don’t throttle any traffic.”36 The Associated 
Press later conducted tests to determine what was causing the interference and 
determined that Comcast was actively interfering with the use of these 
technologies by both throttling speeds and, in some instances, completely 
blocking customer access.37 Comcast later admitted that the company interfered 
with around ten percent of peer-to-peer connections.38 In 2008, the FCC 
enjoined this practice in an order, finding that Comcast’s “selective interference 
 
 29. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2018) (emphasis added).  
 30. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Op. and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 10344–45 (2008) 
[hereinafter BitTorrent Order]. 
 31. Declan McCullagh, Telco Agrees to Stop Blocking VoIP Calls, CNET (Mar. 3, 2005, 6:26 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/telco-agrees-to-stop-blocking-voip-calls/. VoIP is a technology that allows users to 
make voice calls using an Internet connection instead of a regular phone line. Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP), FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/voice-over-internet-protocol-voip (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 32. McCullagh, supra note 31. 
 33. Id.  
 34. BitTorrent Order, supra note 30, at 13031.  
 35. Id. at 13030–31.  
 36. Id.; see also Marguerite Reardon, Comcast Denies Monkeying with BitTorrent Traffic, CNET (Aug. 
21, 2007, 8:09 PM), http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9763901-7.html. 
 37. BitTorrent Order, supra note 30, at 13031.  
 38. Id. at 10351–52. Independent evidence, however, indicated that Comcast interfered with around half 
of these peer-to-peer connections. Id.  
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discourages the ‘development of technologies’ . . . that “maximize user control 
over what information is received by individuals . . . who use the Internet 
because that interference (again) impedes consumers from ‘running 
applications . . . of their choice,’ rather than those favored by Comcast.”39  
In the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, the FCC stated that net neutrality 
throttling and blocking of content is not the problem the public perceives it to 
be, as there are very few documented instances of these neutrality violations 
occurring.40 The Order in fact cites the Madison River and Comcast incidents as 
limited examples of these violations.41 However, there are many more 
documented instances of net neutrality violations that have occurred that were 
not discussed in the Restoring Internet Freedom Order.42 Further, it is entirely 
possible that hundreds or even thousands more violations have occurred that are 
currently undocumented—just because the public is unaware of more violations 
does not mean that the violations are not real.  
D. PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF NET NEUTRALITY 
Generally, net neutrality has received bipartisan support from the public; a 
recent survey found that eight out of ten Americans support it.43 However, at the 
Congressional level, support for net neutrality has been more partisan, with 
Democrat officials generally favoring net neutrality, and Republicans generally 
against the regulatory framework.44  
1. Arguments in Favor of Net Neutrality 
There are a variety of arguments that support net neutrality. Some advocate 
based on free speech principles; these advocates believe that granting broadband 
service providers the ability to control the last mile of content delivery poses a 
risk of chilling free speech online.45 The age of the internet has allowed people 
to connect easier and faster than ever before, and serves as a valuable platform 
for connecting people socially as well as politically. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of free speech in the context of the internet, noting 
 
 39. Id. at 10352–53 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit later invalidated the 
FCC’s order, finding the FCC was not empowered to regulate Comcast’s conduct under its Title I ancillary 
authority. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 40. Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 376 
(2018). 
 41. Id. at 375–76. 
 42. Timothy Karr, Net Neutrality Violations: A Brief History, FREE PRESS (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-analysis/explainers/net-neutrality-violations-brief-history. 
 43. Trendacosta, supra note 10.  
 44. See Roger Cheng & Morgan Little, Net Neutrality: These Are the Senators Who Voted to Save It, CNET 
(May 16, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/senate-votes-to-restore-net-neutrality-heres-how-every-
senator-voted/.  
 45. See Corynne McSherry, An Attack on Net Neutrality Is an Attack on Free Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (June 22, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/attack-net-neutrality-attack-free-speech.  
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that social media “can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available 
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”46  
Others argue that broadband service providers engage in monopolistic and 
anti-competitive behavior, and consumers often lack the ability to choose among 
multiple providers.47 These concerns are partly based on a documented history 
of past net neutrality violations, such as the Madison River and BitTorrent 
instances discussed above.48 
Finally, some advocates argue that non-neutral networks are harmful to 
emerging companies. If broadband internet providers are allowed to charge 
websites and applications for customer access to these websites, it may deter 
innovation.49 While technology giants such as Google and Facebook have no 
problem paying a fee to internet providers, additional costs to new small 
businesses may price them out of business.50  
2. Arguments Against Net Neutrality  
Opponents of net neutrality generally argue that regulations are 
unnecessary to protect consumers. Many point out that the internet functioned 
for nearly twenty years before the FCC implemented net neutrality rules in 
2015.51 Further, opponents argue that the best safeguard against anti-competitive 
practices by internet service providers is to ensure that the market remains 
competitive.52 Some opponents agree that internet service providers should 
abide by net neutrality principles in the absence of FCC regulations,53 though 
not all.54  
Another popular argument against net neutrality is that it disincentivizes 
investment.55 The FCC notes that in the period of time between the 
implementation of the Open Internet Order and the Restoring Internet Freedom 
 
 46. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); see also id. at 1735. (“While in the past 
there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of 
views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace.”). 
 47. Amir Nasr & Joshua Stager, The U.S. Broadband Market Is Deeply Anticompetitive, NEW AM. (Aug. 
21, 2018), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/us-broadband-market-deeply-anticompetitive/.  
 48. See George S. Benjamin, Internet Content Discrimination: The Need for Specific Net Neutrality 
Legislation by Congress or the FCC in Light of the Recent Anti Net-Neutrality Actions by Comcast Corporation, 
39 SW. L. REV. 155, 158–59 (2009) (discussing the documented instances of net neutrality violations by internet 
service providers).  
 49. Id. at 160–61.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Roslyn Layton, We Don’t Need a Government-Run Internet, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-11-27/the-fcc-is-right-to-toss-out-net-
neutrality-rules. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Yaël Ossowski, The Internet Didn’t Need Net Neutrality in 2015, and It Doesn’t Now, WASH. EXAM’R 
(Dec. 13, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-internet-didnt-need-net-neutrality-in-
2015-and-it-doesnt-now. 
 54. Layton, supra note 51. 
 55. Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 40, at 312. 
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Order, investment in broadband infrastructure decreased on the whole, which 
opponents argue is a result of the 2015 net neutrality regulations.56  
Finally, some claim that the FCC lacks the power to regulate internet 
service providers as telecommunications providers under the 1996 Act. 
However, this argument is circular. If broadband service providers were 
classified as information services, this claim would be true; under federal law, 
the FCC currently retains very little power to regulate information service 
providers. However, their classification is a choice that falls within the FCC’s 
discretion. 
E. INTERNET CLASSIFICATION AS AN INFORMATION VERSUS 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE  
The most significant change in the Restoring Internet Freedom Order was 
the re-classification of broadband internet providers as information service 
providers rather than telecommunications service providers. The change in 
classification is significant because it determines which section of the 1996 Act 
applies. In the 1996 Act, Congress distinguished between information services, 
which were largely unregulated, and telecommunications services, which were 
regulated.57 The difference between the two is based on their function. 
Information services require some form of transformation – either a change to 
or processing of data. Telecommunications services, on the other hand, involve 
the transmission of user data without a transformation of the data itself.58 
However, as mentioned above, the 1996 Act did not specifically mention 
regulation of the internet itself, which left its classification ambiguous.59  
Historically, courts have deferred to the FCC to classify broadband internet 
as a telecommunications service or an information service.60 As the FCC is an 
independent agency, its interpretations of the 1934 Act and 1996 Act are 
typically entitled to Chevron deference.61 Under Chevron, a court will assess if 
congressional intent is clear, and if the governing statute is silent or ambiguous 
on the question at issue, a court will uphold an agency’s interpretation of law as 
long as it is reasonable.62 
In 2000, in AT&T v. City of Portland, the Ninth Circuit held that cable 
broadband internet was a telecommunications service.63 Relying on City of 
Portland, the Ninth Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision to classify 
 
 56. Id. at 364. 
 57. 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2018); see also John Blevins, The Use and Abuse of “Light-Touch” Internet 
Regulation, 99 B.U. L. REV. 177, 190 (2019). 
 58. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50).  
 59. See Speta, supra note 20, at 115. 
 60. Jon Brodkin, To Kill Net Neutrality Rules, FCC Says Broadband Isn’t “Telecommunications,” ARS 
TECHNICA (June 1, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/06/to-kill-net-
neutrality-rules-fcc-says-broadband-isnt-telecommunications/. 
 61. See, e.g., Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 697 F.3d 360, 371 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 62. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 63. 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000). The FCC, however, was not a party to this case.  
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broadband internet as an information service in 2003.64 In 2005, the Supreme 
Court reversed in National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Services, which upheld the FCC’s classification, held that Chevron 
deference applied, and that prior inconsistent agency classifications are still 
entitled to Chevron deference.65 Brand X was significant because it held that as 
long as congressional intent is ambiguous, an agency is not precluded from later, 
inconsistent classifications, as long as the later classification is within a zone of 
reasonableness.66  
However, courts have given less deference to the FCC when it has tried to 
regulate the internet under its Title I ancillary authority. In 2010, the FCC 
promulgated the Open Internet Order in its first attempt to establish a net 
neutrality framework.67 This order was, in large part, a reaction to Comcast v. 
FCC, where the Court struck down the FCC’s 2008 decision to enjoin Comcast 
from blocking and throttling of internet traffic.68 The 2010 order did not re-
classify broadband service providers as telecommunications providers, but 
asserted that the FCC had the power to regulate these providers under its Title I 
ancillary authority.69 However, the D.C. Circuit rejected this approach, finding 
that under Title I, the FCC did not have the authority to impose net neutrality 
restrictions on broadband service providers, since they were classified as 
information service providers.70  
In 2015, the FCC promulgated another order, this time classifying 
broadband internet as a telecommunications service.71 This order, unlike its 
predecessors, parsed different functions of broadband internet access, and the 
Commission stated that although some applications such as email, access to 
news, and webpage hosting were information services, the underlying service 
provided by internet service providers was a telecommunications service.72 In 
2016, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission’s classifications under the 2015 
Open Internet Order, finding that the FCC’s reclassification of broadband 
internet as a telecommunications service was reasonable.73  
In the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, the FCC once again re-classified 
internet service providers as information service providers.74 As one of the 
several rationales for this decision, the FCC stated that a “light-touch 
information service framework will promote investment and innovation better 
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than applying costly and restrictive laws of a bygone era to broadband Internet 
access service.”75 The FCC also relied on precedent, noting that broadband 
internet was classified as an information service for almost twenty years prior to 
the 2015 Open Internet Order, and was upheld as a reasonable interpretation 
under Brand X.76 The Restoring Internet Freedom Order also included a 
preemption clause to prevent states from enacting their own legislation that was 
inconsistent with the federal order.77 
In 2018, various technology companies, state governments, and internet 
activist groups challenged the FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband internet 
as an information service and remove net neutrality protection in Mozilla Corp. 
v. FCC.78 Plaintiffs argued that the FCC’s decision should not be entitled to 
Chevron deference, because the Commission did not consider whether some 
aspects of broadband internet service are telecommunications services severable 
from its information service functions. In October 2019, the D.C. Circuit held 
that, under Brand X, the FCC’s decision to classify broadband internet as an 
information service was reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference.79  
F. STATE APPROACHES THUS FAR  
Despite the FCC’s language preempting state action,80 thirty-four states 
introduced bills concerning net neutrality, five of which enacted some form of 
regulation.81 California passed the California Internet Consumer Protection and 
Net Neutrality Act of 2018 (the “California Act”), which prohibits broadband 
service providers from blocking lawful content, prioritizing traffic, engaging in 
paid prioritization, and zero-rating.82 The California Act also requires disclosure 
by internet service providers about broadband network management practices 
and performance.83 While some net neutrality advocates praised California’s 
attempt to push for stronger regulations at the state level,84 others felt that it went 
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too far, calling the California Act a poorly drafted publicity stunt.85 To date, the 
California Act has not gone into effect. Within one hour of California passing 
the California Act, the United States Justice Department sued, arguing that it 
violated federal law and was preempted by the Constitution.86  
Other states have taken a different approach. New York, Montana, and 
Vermont have passed regulations requiring internet service providers holding 
state contracts to abide by net neutrality rules.87 In 2018, Vermont’s governor, 
in particular, issued an executive order that requires internet service providers to 
certify that they will abide by net neutrality principles as a pre-requisite to being 
awarded contracts with the state.88 
II.  PREEMPTION AND ANALYSIS OF STATE NET NEUTRALITY RULES IN THE 
RESTORING INTERNET FREEDOM ORDER 
A. PREEMPTION LANGUAGE SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATES NO STATE 
ACTION  
In the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, the FCC devoted several pages 
to discuss federal preemption.89 The order cites several reasons for preempting 
state action. First, the order states that “[i]nternet access service should be 
governed principally by a uniform set of federal regulations, rather than by a 
patchwork that includes separate state and local requirements.”90 Relatedly, the 
order notes “it is impossible or impracticable for ISPs [internet service 
providers] to distinguish between intrastate and interstate communications over 
the internet or to apply different rules in each circumstance.”91 Second, the order 
notes that state regulations “could impose far greater burdens than the federal 
regulatory regime, [which] could significantly disrupt the balance we strike 
here.”92 The order also relies on the FCC precedent of preempting state 
authority, as the 2015 Open Internet Order also preempted state action on 
conflicting net neutrality regulations.93 
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B. LEGAL AUTHORITY IN THE PREEMPTION ORDER 
Additionally, the Restoring Internet Freedom Order cited specific legal 
authority for its preemption decision. The main argument, known as the 
“impossibility exception” to state jurisdiction, holds that “the FCC may preempt 
state law when (1) it is impossible or impracticable to regulate the intrastate 
aspects of a service without affecting interstate communications and (2) the 
Commission determines that such regulation would interfere with federal 
regulatory objectives.”94 The FCC also noted that its decision to preempt state 
action was consistent “with the longstanding federal policy of nonregulation for 
information services.”95  
1. The Commerce Clause 
The underlying preemption power for the impossibility exception is based 
in the Commerce Clause. Article I section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress 
the power to regulate commerce between states, as well as make any laws that 
are “necessary and proper” to execute this power.96 The Commerce Clause 
applies to both interstate and intrastate activity, as long as the intrastate activity 
is not strictly internal.97  
There are several Commerce Clause cases that address the FCC’s 
preemption authority. In Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, Missouri enacted 
a statute which prohibited local governments from providing 
telecommunications services.98 The 1996 Act provided that no state or local law 
could “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to 
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service,” and also 
authorized the FCC to preempt state law that violated this provision.99 Plaintiffs, 
including several municipally owned internet providers, sought a declaration 
from the FCC declaring the state statute unlawful.100 The FCC upheld the statute, 
determining that “any entity” under the 1996 Act did not include municipal 
subdivisions of the state, only private parties subject to state regulation, as there 
was no clear statement from Congress as is required to preempt state 
regulation.101 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “federal legislation 
threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own 
governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a way that 
preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power” in the absence of a clear 
congressional statement.102 
 
 94. Id. at 429.  
 95. Id. at 431.  
 96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.  
 97. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 98. 541 U.S. 125, 129 (2004).  
 99. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2018); see Nixon, 541 U.S. at 128. 
 100. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 128.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 140.  
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Similarly, in Tennessee v. FCC, several states passed laws restricting the 
expansion of municipal telecommunications providers.103 The FCC issued an 
order preempting the state laws, finding that preemption would promote and 
increase competition in the broadband marketplace, one of the goals of the 1996 
Act.104 The states sued, arguing that there was no clear statement from Congress 
for the FCC to preempt state regulations, and the Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed, 
holding that the FCC lacked the authority to preempt states.105  
In both cases, courts ultimately reached the same result—the FCC lacked 
the authority to preempt state legislation, because the 1996 Act did not include 
a clear statement from Congress. However, unlike the state police power relied 
upon in those cases, the regulation of net neutrality and the internet more 
generally is clearly interstate and extends beyond the realm of simple police 
powers.106 Several circuit courts have agreed, holding that even if information is 
transmitted over the internet within the same state, it is tantamount to moving 
information across state lines, and “thus constitutes transportation in interstate 
commerce.”107 Treating the internet as interstate for the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause makes sense; it would be difficult or impossible to determine 
where each internet connection is being accessed, where the information is being 
transmitted to and from, and what legal regime applies to each connection. With 
the increased accessibility of the “world wide web,” which allows people to 
instantly communicate with others anywhere in the world, it is a strained 
argument to claim the internet can be regulated on an intra-state level.  
2. Impossibility Exception to State Action  
Even if some components of broadband internet are inherently interstate, 
states may argue that some components are intrastate and severable and can 
therefore be regulated at both the state and federal level. This argument was 
addressed under the impossibility exception in the Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order. The Supreme Court first recognized this principle in Louisiana Public 
Service Commission v. FCC,108 and has since refined it in subsequent cases to 
clarify that the “FCC may preempt state law when (1) it is impossible or 
impracticable to regulate the intrastate aspects of a service without affecting 
interstate communications and (2) the Commission determines that such 
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regulation would interfere with federal regulatory objectives.”109 Here, the 
FCC’s decision to re-classify broadband as an information service rather than a 
telecommunications service likely satisfies both requirements. 
In the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, the FCC concluded that it was 
impracticable to parse the inter- and intrastate functions of the internet under the 
first prong of the impossibility exception.110 Whether it is actually possible is a 
highly technical issue that has not been extensively studied outside of the FCC 
itself. However, under the Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC’s fact-based 
conclusion would be reviewed under the highly deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, under which an agency’s decision on an issue of fact will 
not be overturned by a court unless it is wholly unreasonable.111 
Additionally, an analogous case involving VoIP services supports the 
FCC’s factual conclusions. In Minnesota Public Utilities Commission v. FCC, 
the FCC preempted states from regulating VoIP based on the impossibility 
exception, claiming that it would be impracticable or impossible to separate 
interstate and intrastate aspects of the technology.112 The Eighth Circuit held that 
based on the technical nature of the issue, the court deferred to the FCC’s factual 
finding that the components were not severable.113 The court also acknowledged 
that “accessing different websites or IP addresses during the same 
communication and performing different types of communications 
simultaneously, none of which the provider has a means to separately track or 
record by geographic location,” justified applying the impossibility exception to 
VoIP services.114 
In the absence of independent analysis, it is likely that broadband internet, 
similar to VoIP services in Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, will be 
preempted from state regulation based on the impossibility exception. Because 
many people use the internet to connect with others across state lines, and it is 
not feasible for internet providers to distinguish if a single connection is inter- 
or intrastate, the first prong is satisfied. 
The second prong of the impossibility exception is also met. The FCC in 
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order stated that “[o]ur order today establishes 
a calibrated federal regulatory regime based on the pro-competitive, 
deregulatory goals of the 1996 Act.”115 As the FCC expressly stated, the order’s 
goal was to pursue deregulation of the internet as an information service. 
Therefore, inconsistent state regulations that regulate broadband internet under 
a telecommunications service regime are clearly in conflict with the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order. 
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Under the Commerce Clause, the Constitution delegates the regulation of 
interstate commerce to the federal government. Given the interstate nature of the 
internet, state-level net neutrality regulations like California’s are likely to be 
struck down under Brand X. Further, even if the state is able to argue that some 
aspects of the internet are interstate and severable from other intrastate 
components, the California Act would still fail the second prong of the 
impossibility exception, as it interferes with the FCC’s decision to classify 
broadband internet as an information service.  
3. Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause  
In addition to federal preemption based on the Commerce Clause, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause also restricts state action in some circumstances. 
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, states can be preempted from acting if 
state action conflicts with federal regulation,116 or if a state regulation 
discriminates against out of state commerce, even in the absence of federal 
regulation.117 However, courts have also recognized an exception to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’s effects on state action known as the market participant 
doctrine.  
The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in Hughes v. Alexandria 
Scrap Corp., when it addressed the question of “whether, when a State enters 
the market as purchaser for end use of items in interstate commerce, it may 
‘(restrict) its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the State.’”118 Today, 
the market participant doctrine is generally understood to mean that if a state is 
acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, the state is not 
bound by the Commerce Clause.119  
For example, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction 
Employers, Inc., Boston issued an executive order requiring that in all 
construction contracts funded by the city or state, at least fifty percent of the 
employees must be Boston residents.120 Construction employers challenged the 
executive order, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause because it 
prioritized hiring of Boston residents over out of state residents.121 The Supreme 
Court upheld the executive order, holding that “when a state or local government 
enters the market as a participant [rather than a market regulator] it is not subject 
to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.”122 
However, courts have recently narrowed the market participant doctrine, 
particularly when a state claims to be acting as a market participant but is in 
effect imposing restrictions on private parties as a market regulator. For 
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example, in Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, a California statute forbade 
employers that received certain levels of state funds from using those funds to 
advocate for or against union activities, in conflict with the federal National 
Labor Relations Act.123 Instead of the statute applying only to state projects, it 
applied to any employer that received a certain amount of funds from the state.124 
The Ninth Circuit struck down the statute, finding that based on its broad 
application, its scope “indicates a general state position, not a narrow attempt to 
achieve a specific goal,” and thus, the state was acting as a market regulator.125  
The approach of some states, such as Vermont, requiring internet service 
providers to abide by net neutrality principles as a prerequisite to contracts with 
the state are likely preempted. As in Lockyer, although these states purport to be 
acting as a market participant, the intent and effect of their legislation is to 
impose regulations. To avoid this issue, these states could narrow the restriction, 
so that internet service providers agree to abide by net neutrality principles in 
the limited circumstance of providing services to the state, as in White. However, 
this approach is still likely to be challenged, as the FCC and internet providers 
may argue that it is not feasible to parse the internet services provided to the 
state versus other, non-restricted connections in the same or other states.  
C. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS IN THE MOZILLA V. FCC DECISION  
In October 2019, the D.C. Circuit made several key rulings regarding the 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order. First, the court held that based on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brand X, the FCC’s decision to classify broadband 
internet as an information service was reasonable under Chevron.126 The court 
noted that, at this point, “the [Brand X] Court made clear in its decision—over 
and over—that the Act left the [classification] to the agency's discretion.”127 
Thus, it is unlikely that net neutrality advocates can make the same argument in 
future cases.  
Second, the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC failed to show its legal authority 
to preempt all state legislation that is more stringent than the Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order.128 The court began by discussing how, as the FCC re-classified 
broadband internet as an information service, it only has “ancillary authority” 
under Title I to regulate it.129 As a result of reclassifying broadband internet from 
a Title II telecommunications service to a Title I information service, the court 
held that the FCC could not utilize the impossibility exception that was 
previously recognized in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC.130 
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Even after the D.C. Circuit’s decision, it is still not clear that state laws will 
be upheld. The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC’s preemption directive went too 
far, and that the impossibility exception does not apply in circumstances where, 
as here, the FCC is relying on its ancillary authority under Title I, rather than its 
express authority to regulate under Titles II–IV of the 1934 Act.131 However, the 
D.C. Circuit chose to reserve judgment on the FCC’s authority to preempt 
specific state laws that conflict with federal law.132 Further, states are still facing 
other legal battles over their net neutrality regulations from the federal 
government.133 
Additionally, as the dissent explains, it is not clear that the impossibility 
exception does not apply in the context of information services.134 For example, 
in Minnesota Public Utilities Commission v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit upheld an 
order preempting state regulation of VoIP before the FCC had classified VoIP 
as either an information service or a telecommunications service.135 Instead, in 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, the court’s impossibility exception 
analysis rested solely on whether or not it was practically possible to parse the 
inter- and intrastate aspects of VoIP.136 Thus, despite the majority’s holding in 
Mozilla, the Title I versus Title II classification is not always the deciding factor 
of whether the FCC is able to invoke the impossibility exception to preempt state 
action.  
 Finally, the court only addressed the arguments that the FCC raised in the 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order, namely the impossibility exception to state 
action, and the federal government’s general policy of non-regulation of 
information services.137 The court did not address the Commerce Clause or the 
market participant exception to the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the FCC will 
likely utilize other alternative arguments in future cases against individual states. 
D. THERE IS A LACK OF COMPETITION IN THE BROADBAND INTERNET 
MARKET 
Many of the concerns surrounding net neutrality would not be problematic 
in an open, fully competitive market for broadband internet. Although the intent 
of the 1996 Act was to increase competition in the telecommunications industry 
by forcing phone companies to open their phone lines to competitors, many 
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believe that the 1996 Act failed to foster competition, particularly with respect 
to internet service providers.138  
Across the United States, there are over 2600 broadband internet service 
providers.139 However, many of these providers are small networks that function 
in one city, or even parts of a single city. On a national level, a recent FCC report 
concluded that thirty percent of census blocks have one provider for high speed 
internet, and thirteen percent have no available provider for high speed 
internet.140 Only twenty-six percent of census blocks in this survey reported 
having a choice between three or more high speed internet providers.141 Even in 
cities, many consumers lack the ability to choose between internet service 
providers. A recent study by New York City found that thirteen-and-a-half 
percent of homes in New York City had one option for broadband internet 
services, fifty-five-and-a-half percent of homes had the choice between two 
providers, and around thirty percent had a choice between three or more 
providers.142  
Even in areas where there are multiple competing providers, consumers 
face substantial costs and inconvenience when trying to change providers, 
including searching costs, uncertainty costs, compatibility costs, contractual 
costs and transaction costs.143 Some of these costs are quantifiable—such as the 
costs to be relieved of existing contracts, but others, such as uncertainty and 
searching costs, are an investment of time and resources that many people are 
unwilling or unable to commit to.  
In the United States, the market for broadband internet access in its current 
form is not competitive.144 Although some claim that it is,145 the 
telecommunications industry exhibits characteristics that traditionally define 
monopolies. For example, in natural monopolies, the up-front costs of servicing 
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the public is high, and the marginal cost of serving each individual customer is 
low.146 Telecommunications systems are expensive to set up in terms of up-front 
costs, as each provider sets up its own infrastructure, but adding each customer 
to the overall framework makes the cost of running this service more 
economically feasible.147 As a result, it is not an attractive option for private 
competitors to enter the market. For broadband internet to continue to provide 
open access to consumers, it must become more competitive or have net 
neutrality protections in place.  
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed in Part II, state-level net neutrality regulation is the wrong 
approach to resolving the national net neutrality debate, as state regulations will 
likely be struck down as preempted and ignore the practical difficulties involved 
in distinguishing between interstate and intrastate communications. However, 
net neutrality principles have been almost uniformly viewed as valuable and 
necessary since these issues were first raised in the early 2000s. However, unlike 
the FCC and some advocates propose, the telecommunications industry as it 
presently exists is not sufficiently competitive to ensure that internet service 
providers will not violate net neutrality principles. In this final Part, several 
alternatives that will ensure that consumers are adequately protected against net 
neutrality violations are presented.  
A. RE-DRAFTING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT  
One possible solution is for Congress to re-draft the 1996 Act to provide 
more clarity and stability in its classification of broadband service providers. 
Since the FCC has switched between classifying broadband service as an 
information and telecommunications service and both classifications have been 
upheld as reasonable interpretations under the 1996 Act, Congress should 
resolve the issue by re-writing the regulations to explicitly address internet 
services. The FCC’s governing statute was written in a time when the internet 
did not exist as it does today; Titles II, III, and IV classifications are all based 
on the 1934 Act. As a result, the regulation of the internet as an “information 
service” is a loose, undefined framework subject to the will and whims of each 
new administration. The inflexible choice between largely unregulated 
information services and heavily regulated telecommunications services is 
unworkable.148 Since it is clear that broadband services should be subject to 
some form of oversight or regulation, Congress could clarify the FCC’s role, as 
well as provide a clearer policy position for how the internet should be regulated.  
A major downside of this approach is cost—rewriting a statute is costly 
and diverts Congress’s attention away from other, often more pressing policy 
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matters. Further, this approach runs the risk of special interest groups, more 
specifically broadband service providers or lobbyists, ghostwriting the rules in 
a way that is beneficial to the broadband industry itself, but may not be in the 
best interest of the public more generally. Additionally, this solution may be 
unlikely, at least for the next few years. Political gridlock in Washington is 
difficult to overcome, and recent congressional statements indicate that 
legislators are avoiding the larger problem of rewriting the rules in favor of 
trying to re-classify broadband internet as a telecommunications service once 
again.149  
B. EXPAND THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO ANOTHER 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY  
Another possible approach is to confer additional rulemaking and 
enforcement authority to another agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). In the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, the FCC noted that “[i]n the 
unlikely event that ISPs engage in conduct that harms Internet openness,” the 
FTC can step in and protect consumers from “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”150 However, the federal government is often inefficient; one recent 
study calculated that less than one out of every one hundred dollars of 
government spending is actually used effectively.151 Relatedly, many 
government agencies are unable to manage their own information databases, let 
alone effectively communicate that information to other agencies.152 As the FCC 
is already responsible for regulating the telecommunications industry, it is likely 
that delegating authority to another agency to perform essentially the same tasks 
will increase government waste without meaningfully contributing to a better 
solution.  
It is also unclear if the FTC has the authority to enforce net neutrality 
principles, or if it does, if it will be willing to do so. Recently, the FTC Chairman 
noted that “blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization would not be per 
se antitrust violations.”153 Under the FTC Act, the agency is responsible for 
policing unfair, fraudulent, and deceptive practices.154 However, as the FCC 
recently re-classified broadband providers as information service providers, the 
FTC’s authority extends only to policing if internet service providers are 
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accurately disclosing their policies.155 As the Restoring Internet Freedom Order 
is unclear on if blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization practices are 
unlawful, the order delineates no clear pathway for the FTC to police these anti-
competitive practices. Further, even if internet service providers disclose their 
blocking or throttling practices, this fails to increase consumer protections if 
consumers lack a choice between competing providers. 
C. MUNICIPAL BROADBAND MODEL 
Communities that are unhappy with the current state of broadband may 
want to turn to local government networks as an alternative to services that are 
currently provided by national internet service providers. Instead of states 
drafting legislation that subjects private broadband providers to net neutrality 
principles, municipalities can create their own broadband networks for local 
customers. In 2015, close to 500 municipalities had implemented their own 
networks.156 One of the most successful examples of this model is the city of 
Chattanooga, Tennessee.157 The Electric Power Board of Chattanooga offers 
internet services to residents of the city for seventy dollars a month, and within 
four years of service the model was already turning a profit.158 As further proof 
of its success, Chattanooga’s publicly-owned service was the highest rated 
internet service provider in a recent consumer reports survey in terms of value, 
and also received high marks for speed and reliability.159  
This approach, however, assumes that all local governments are well-
equipped to build and integrate this type of infrastructure, many of which are 
not. Further, this approach has received strong opposition from private 
broadband service providers. In 2008, as Chattanooga was beginning to build its 
infrastructure to create its network, Comcast sued the Electric Power Board to 
enjoin its development; however, the city of Chattanooga prevailed in state 
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court.160 This municipal model may result in increased competition as well; 
Comcast began offering competitive rates and speeds in the Chattanooga area in 
2015.161  
Another roadblock to this model is the state itself. In the time since Nixon 
v. Missouri Municipal League, which held that states could prohibit 
municipalities, but not private actors, from providing telecommunications 
services,162 many states have banned municipalities from creating their own 
broadband providers. As of 2019, twenty-five states have created significant 
roadblocks or outright banned municipal networks.163 These laws are largely the 
product of lobbying efforts of the telecommunications industry.164 As a result, 
this option is not available to all communities, but if municipal broadband 
networks are protected at a federal level, they could be a promising alternative 
to federal net neutrality protections.  
D. OPEN ACCESS MODEL  
Another possible modification on the local municipal model is the open 
access model. An open access model would function like a road, allowing 
multiple providers to operate on publicly or privately owned infrastructure, 
creating competition to improve speeds and lower prices.165 This could be 
accomplished by state or local governments building the infrastructure, and then 
leasing out its use to internet service providers, or alternatively could be 
facilitated through the private sector. Under the current broadband model, 
internet service providers build and own the physical infrastructure as well as 
offer internet services to consumers. As the cost of duplicating the physical 
infrastructure required to provide broadband service is costly, there is little 
incentive for new providers to compete, especially in more rural areas. Under 
the open access model, allowing competitors to use existing infrastructure will 
create a more competitive broadband market, which will result in lower prices, 
higher quality of service, and increased service coverage for the population as a 
whole.166  
There are several advantages to the open access model. In 2009, a FCC-
sponsored study found that open access networks in other countries resulted in 
lower prices and faster service for customers than traditional broadband service 
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providers.167 Further, if all internet service providers function on the same 
network and infrastructure, net neutrality would be a de facto rule, as providers 
who refused to abide by these principles would be less attractive to 
consumers.168 However, as with the municipal broadband model, many existing 
internet service providers oppose open access, since they have already invested 
in building the physical infrastructure for their own networks and favor less 
competition.  
CONCLUSION  
Net neutrality is a complex issue that deserves ample time and attention 
from lawmakers. As seen in the Brand X, Comcast, and Mozilla decisions, 
federal courts have held that the FCC is permitted to classify broadband internet 
as an information service or telecommunications service. Given this flexibility, 
it is likely that in the immediate future, net neutrality will continue to be a 
partisan issue vulnerable to upheaval as a result of changes in the regulatory 
state.  
Unless Congress significantly reforms the 1996 Act, we are unlikely to see 
permanent change on the federal level. State regulations, such as the California 
Act, that attempt to implement state-level net neutrality restrictions are likely to 
be struck down in court based on the federal government’s preemption power of 
inconsistent state regulations. Vermont and other states that restrict broadband 
service providers from engaging in these anti-neutral practices may be able to 
effectuate change on a state level as market participants, but the obligations of 
broadband service providers would likely be limited to their contracts for 
internet services with state agencies, and not generally applicable to all 
customers in the state as a whole.  
There are several viable alternatives that can accomplish the same goals as 
state or federal net neutrality legislation. Municipal governments may seek to 
protect net neutrality principles by creating their own broadband internet 
networks. This approach would give communities more control over the 
structure of the prices and regulations of their internet, as well as more control 
over net neutrality. However, internet providers are strongly opposed and have 
succeeded in lobbying many states to pass legislation that prohibits these 
models. Additionally, because private internet service providers have already 
built their own infrastructure, this method may be costly to duplicate. 
Nevertheless, all state and local efforts are not entirely futile. Even though 
regulations implementing state-level net neutrality rules are likely to be struck 
down, these attempts signal to the market and lawmakers that net neutrality is 
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an issue that many states are concerned about and will not stop trying to protect 
net neutrality without a fight.  
 
